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1. Forthcoming impact assessment of the Consumer Credit Directive 
 
In October 2018 the European Commission authorised a comprehensive impact assessment 
and an evaluation of the Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (CCD).1 
Ten years after its adoption, the number of over-indebted households has significantly 
increased in most Member States (MS) of the EU.2 The notion of over-indebtedness is used 
when individuals are unable to meet their financial obligations, which often results from 
consumers purchasing on credit.3 Its severe economic and social consequences involve 
negative effects on consumption and employment as well as the adoption of austerity 
measures like social welfare cuts or tax increase.4 Since consumer credit contracts often 
establish long-term obligations, involve significant amounts of money5 and their terms are not 
understandable to consumers because of their complexity and the consumers’ lack of financial 
literacy,6 the need for a robust consumer protection framework has already been established.7 
The worsening trend in the consumers’ financial situation indicates that the so-far adopted 
measures might not be effectively protecting consumers against the current challenges in the 
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financial world. This warrants a closer look at the provisions of the CCD and the 
implementation, and functioning thereof, in the MS. 
The CCD aims to ensure greater market competitiveness, promote confidence in the use of 
consumer credit, secure contract fairness and tackle over-indebtedness.8 To reach these 
objectives, the CCD adopted a variety of preventive and corrective measures. These measures 
include information obligations, the principle of responsible lending, creditworthiness 
assessment, standardisation of cost calculation (with the introduction of the Annual 
Percentage Rate, APR) and information (through the adoption of the Standard European 
Consumer Credit Information form, SECCI), the right of withdrawal and the early repayment 
of credit.9 What will the current evaluation of some of these measures and their 
implementation show? 
 
2. Information obligations 
 
Amongst the above-mentioned measures, information duties remain the main consumer 
protection tool used in the area of consumer credit.10 The European legislator tends to believe 
that consumers who have received adequate information about consumer credit will 
knowledgeably compare credit offers available on the market.11 They will make a responsible 
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decision on a particular credit agreement12 and know how to enforce their contractual rights.13 
The example of foreign currency loans, popular in the last two decades in many MS of 
Eastern and Central Europe, illustrates the importance of understandable information on credit 
conditions, and the consequences of concluding a consumer credit contract. Such loans lead to 
borrowing money in or linked to a currency that diverges from the one in which consumers 
receive their salaries. Consequently, it is the fluctuation of the foreign currency on the market 
that determines the exact amount of the payable credit. Any appreciation of the foreign 
currency will increase the cost of the consumer credit and since the consumer receives his or 
her salary in the local currency, he or she will not find relief in their income increasing 
simultaneously, as well. In the Andriciuc case,14 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared 
it insufficient for credit providers to only inform consumers of the link between the foreign 
and the local currencies in the calculation of the credit’s amount. Instead, credit providers are 
expected to illustrate the risk consumers are taking when borrowing in a foreign currency, by 
showing them the possible variations in the exchange rate and their economic impact. 
The Andriciuc case is just one of the recent examples of the ECJ’s case law on foreign 
currency loans where the ECJ indicates in detail how credit providers could comply with their 
information obligations. Such specific guidelines are missing in the CCD and the Guidelines 
of the Commission.15 Furthermore, the Guidelines seem to declare that the enforcement of the 
provision of credit information to consumers will be limited to ensuring that only formal 
transparency requirements have been met. Namely, they emphasise the need to provide 
information, which is neither lengthy nor hidden in other information, in order to enhance the 
information’s understandability. Depending on whether national enforcement authorities 
followed the Commission’s guidelines or the ECJ’s case law, we could thus expect to find 
different applications of the provisions of the CCD. Such differences should highlight a need 
for more regulatory intervention in this area. This intervention could require credit providers 
to test the understandability of their disclosure on a representative sample of consumers. 
Moreover, it could lead to the adoption of the same toolbox, e.g. further defining requirements 
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for the transparent provision of information, or even standardisation. 
 
3. Standardisation 
 
One of the biggest achievements of the CCD is the introduction of a standard formula for the 
calculation of the credit’s cost – the APR. Article 3 CCD defines the APR as ‘the total cost of 
the credit to the consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the total amount of credit’.16 
The introduction of this standard cost calculation aims to ensure a greater comparability of 
credit offers for consumers and to avoid deceptive cost presentation.17 This, in turn, should 
contribute to consumers’ better informed decision-making. 
As behavioural studies have widely recognised that standardisation increases the disclosures’ 
transparency,18 the European legislator attempted to standardise not only the credit cost but 
also the provision of other information.19 Under the CCD, mandatory pre-contractual 
information generally has to be provided through the SECCI form.20 However, credit 
providers may give consumers additional information, as long as they issue it in a separate 
document, annexed to the SECCI form.21 The flexibility granted to credit providers in issuing 
additional explanations may not be in the consumers’ best interests. Scholars have identified 
that information overload has a negative impact on the consumers’ level of understanding.22 
Moreover, providing consumers with other than mandatory information might distract them 
from the information that is most relevant for their decision-making.23 The lack of form 
prescribed for the provision of additional information could also be questioned. If the 
European policymaker believes that the use of a table in the SECCI form increases the 
disclosure’s transparency, it is surprising that credit providers are not obliged to disclose 
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additional information in the same manner. This difference could perhaps be explained by the 
varied importance of mandatory versus additional information. The European legislator might 
have attempted to ensure a more prominent display of mandatory information through the use 
of the SECCI form, as well as allowing consumers to better identify the disclosures  required 
by law from those chosen by credit providers. However, the European policymaker does not 
require that the display of additional information should be less prominent than that of 
mandatory information. Furthermore, previous research found that consumers found the 
information presented in tables such as the SECCI form to be unclear and difficult to 
understand.24 Therefore another goal of the evaluation should be to examine the effectiveness 
of the attempted standardisation of credit information and test whether policymakers should 
rely on standardisation in a more consistent manner. 
 
4. Creditworthiness assessment & responsible lending 
 
The original proposal of the European Commission for the CCD intended to introduce the 
principle of responsible lending as a leading principle of consumer protection in the consumer 
credit framework. The principle of responsible lending would have obliged a credit provider 
to assess, by any means at his disposal, the creditworthiness of consumers, prior to providing 
them with a credit offer. This assessment would have then informed a credit advice that the 
credit provider issues to consumers.25 Despite its potential for diminishing the consumer over-
indebtedness this proposal was heavily criticised and, therefore, the final version of the CCD 
heavily curtailed this duty. Most importantly, the CCD did not determine the credit provider’s 
obligations in case the consumer lacked creditworthiness.26 The author expects the 
Commission to now re-evaluate the need to further regulate the creditworthiness assessment, 
its application in cross-border situations and legal consequences of a consumer’s lack of 
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creditworthiness. Perhaps, following the example of the Mortgage Credit Directive,27 credit 
providers should only make the consumer credit available when the results of the 
creditworthiness assessment showed that consumers would likely meet their obligations under 
the credit agreement. 
 
5. What to expect? 
 
The commissioned evaluation of the CCD will be comprehensive. It will not only examine the 
implementation of the above-mentioned measures in all MS but also analyse the economic 
impact of the adoption of these measures on the credit market. As it uses mystery shopper 
exercises in its methodology, it may provide the additional information on the consumers’ 
experience and identify further vulnerabilities and best practices in the credit market. We can 
expect it to address the applicability and suitability of the current CCD framework to protect 
consumers against the risks of mis-selling and over-indebtedness coming with the new forms 
of lending and credit providers, such as crowdfunding, fast credits, SMS loans. It should also 
provide an overview of the different regulatory choices made by the Member States in the 
non-harmonised areas, e.g., with respect of adopting caps on interest rates, supervisory 
requirements and sanctions. Scholars and practitioners in the consumer credit field should, 
therefore, pay attention in the coming months when the evaluation report is published and 
anticipate EU legislative actions to follow. 
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